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Abstract
Is there a rational component in the decision to commit suicide? Economists
have been trying to shed light on this question by studying whether suicide rates
are related to contemporaneous socioeconomic conditions. This paper goes one
step further: we test whether suicides are linked to forward-looking behavior.
In Italy, collective sentence reductions (pardons) often lead to massive releases
of prisoners. More importantly, they are usually preceded by prolonged parlia-
mentary activity (legislative proposals, discussion, voting, etc.) that inmates
seem to follow closely. We use the legislative proposals for collective pardons
to measure changes in the inmates’ expectations about the length of their sen-
tences, and find that suicide rates tend to be significantly lower when pardons
are proposed in congress. This suggests that, amongst inmates in Italian pris-
ons, the average decision to commit suicide responds to changes in current
expectations about future conditions. At least partially, therefore, the decision
seems rationalizable.
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1 Introduction
According to the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (www.cdc.gov) in
2013 suicides were the 2nd leading cause of death for the age groups 15-24 and 25-
34 (homicide ranking 3rd) as well as the 10th leading cause of death across all age
groups (homicide ranking 16th), with the corresponding estimated annual medical
and work loss being nearly $35 billion. Based on the last survey by the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, in the United States alone about 8
million adults had suicidal thoughts in 2008, while about 1 million attempted suicide
(with 1 in 25 attempts being successful).1 The picture is not that different if we look
at Europe. Suicide is a significant cause of death in many EU member states, with
approximately 60,000 such deaths in 2010 (OECD, 2012). In Italy more particularly
there were about 3000 suicides in 2010, or 6 for every 100,000 inhabitants (ISTAT,
2012).2
Suicide is a relevant and highly complex issue, largely studied in social sciences
as the end result of the interaction of several factors. In sociology and economics
especially there is a long history of relating suicide patterns to more universal so-
cioeconomic phenomena.3 The very aim in Durkheim (1952) - widely considered as
the pioneering work on sociology - was to explain suicide as the product of social
conditions and structures, a line of approach that has henceforth influenced heav-
1More Americans successfully commit suicide each year than die in motor accidents - see
Daly et al. (2011).
2Among European countries, Italy has one of the lowest suicide rates. Because of a social stigma,
however, the official statistics might be underreporting the real number of suicidal events.
3There is an equally long history in psychology behind the so-called “psychiatric thesis.” Namely,
that suicide is always the product of some psychopathological condition, effected by causes that are
biological rather than social, to be found amongst the relevant types of mental disorder. This thesis
has not been born out by empirical findings: there is no systematic evidence for the contention that
suicide is universally associated with identifiable forms of mental illness - see Giddens (1965) but
also WHO (2014). As a result, nowadays most psychologists concede that suicides are not isolated
acts but a spectrum of activities related to a diversity of risk factors. See Barzilay and Apter (2014)
for a comprehensive review of the predominant psychological theories of suicidal phenomena.
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ily an important part of the sociological literature.4 Though far less comprehen-
sive, following the seminal studies in Hamermesh and Soss (1974) and more recently
Becker and Posner (2004), treatments in economics have also viewed suicide as po-
tentially a social phenomenon, affected by the interplay of societal and individual
factors.
Despite the relevance of the issue and the wide interest in social sciences about
the topic, our understanding of the socioeconomic components of suicidal behavior
remains convoluted, to say the least. The most significant theoretical insights are
often at odds with one another, while the conjectured causal relations are far from
clear. The empirical evidence is mixed, with the relevant literature suffering from a
dramatic lack of methodological rigor.5 The aim of this paper is to shed light upon
a systematic dimension in the aetiology of suicide via means of a clean identification
method.
In what follows, we test whether new information about the future influences the
decision to commit suicide in a particular social environment, Italian prisons. This is
not meant to imply that psychopathological conditions do not matter for suicides.6
Attempts towards systematic explanations between one’s current state of mind and
one’s expectations of the future state of affairs are by no means exclusive to soci-
ology or economics. There is a consensus amongst psychologists that hopelessness
(i.e., the inability to change “burdensomeness” and “thwarted belongingness”) is an
4Durkheim contended that in modern societies three types of social structure produce partic-
ularly high rates of suicide: egoism, altruism, and anomie. The first two refer, respectively, to
excessively-low and excessively-high levels of social integration (i.e., the extent to which individual
members subordinate themselves to a social group by adhering to shared rituals, practices, and
beliefs), while the third to a dearth of regulative norms. The many, and to a large extent equally
important, sociological studies that Durkheim’s analysis inspired have been reviewed in Giddens
(1965) and more recently in Stack (1982).
5For critical reviews on the issues with the theory and empirics of the relevant literature, see
Andres (2005), Stack (1982), Gvion and Apter (2011), Koo and Cox (2008), or Ruhm (2000).
6Ludwig, Marcotte, and Norberg (2009), for example, based on country-level data, find strong
evidence that the use of anti-depressants reduces suicide rates.
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important predictor of suicide - see, for instance, Van Orden et al. (2010).
In sharp contrast to existing empirical studies, however, the environmental con-
fines within which we conduct our test render our investigation immune to the main
methodological problems when it comes to measuring expectations about environ-
mental conditions. More importantly, they allow us to measure exogenous changes
in expectations. Even though expectations are hard to measure and highly diverse
across individuals, prisons and suicides in prisons represent, respectively, almost
ideal experimental grounds and events.
On the one hand, as the environment in which the experiment takes place, prisons
are closed and isolated - which reduces the influence of external factors (family,
friends, career prospects, current socioeconomic conditions, etc.) that might be
latent or hard to measure consistently across individuals and over time. As events,
on the other hand, suicides in prisons are fully recorded, while changes in the typical
underlying individual expected utility depend almost exclusively upon changes in
one’s expected length of sentence.7
The existing empirical research on the causes of suicides has been limited to two
distinct approaches. The sociological investigations have almost universally relied
upon simple correlational studies between suicide rates and a rather limited range of
socioeconomic variables. The psychological studies of suicide have been based almost
wholly upon psychiatric case-histories, either from observations of individuals who
have made unsuccessful attempts at suicide or from post factum analysis of records of
mental-hospital patients who subsequently committed suicide (see McMillan et al.,
7As typically the case in a prison system, Italian prisons hold also inmates awaiting trial. For
these individuals, other things being equal, one’s expected length of sentence is obviously the
relevant variable. With respect to the already sentenced criminals, it is the actual length of sentence
that really matters. For, to quote from Kaminski (2004), “an inmate’s dream is to fall asleep one
day and wake up half a year later.” But even in these cases expectations do come into play, since
the actual time one will eventually serve might be significantly shorter than the nominal sentence
itself.
3
2007, Kovacs and Garrison, 1985). While undoubtedly innovative and useful, either
approach is subject to its own fundamental methodological issue. Lacking reliable
identification strategies, the correlational evidence is generally weak, if not mislead-
ing. While one can try to measure expectations or hopelessness (using the scale in
Beck, Kovacs, and Weissman, 1975, Beck et al., 2014), it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to consistently measure and compare (exogenous) changes in expectations using
psychiatric data across individuals and over time.
Applied economists but also policy makers have tried to establish whether the
actual decision to commit suicide includes a rational component.8 That is, whether
incentives and changes at the margin (of the kind typically addressed in economic
analysis) do matter, even though the underlying decision-making situation is as
extreme and the choice itself as irreversible as suicide. To this end, the economic
intuition predicts that individuals decide to commit suicide when this appears to be
the most preferred alternative - in the sense that the discounted expected lifetime
utility falls below a certain threshold.
The evolution of the underlying theoretical framework started with simple com-
parisons of net present values in Hamermesh and Soss (1974), followed by more
comprehensive efforts towards incorporating the various elements utility might de-
pend upon - see, for instance, Koo and Cox (2008) and Becker and Posner (2004).9
It culminated with the elaboration of models in which the very irreversibility of
8Interestingly, many ancient cultures - such as the Greeks, the Romans, the Japanese, and the
Indians - also considered rational dimensions in suicide. They often viewed suicide as a rational
response to illness, disgrace, or other pain and suffering. See the relevant discussion (as well as the
extracts from Hume and Schopenhauer) in Becker and Posner (2004).
9In Hamermesh and Soss (1974) the main predictions were that suicide risk ought to be signif-
icantly related to age and decreases in permanent income. On the one hand, since one’s utility
increases with income, an increase in permanent income reduces suicide risk. On the other, since
expected lifetime utility decreases with age, other things being equal, suicide risk increases with
age. In Koo and Cox (2008), human capital is another determinant of expected utility. As human
capital depreciates during spells of unemployment (due to the lack of continuous on-the-job train-
ing), unemployment increases suicide risk - by having an adverse effect not only on current income
levels, but more importantly on expectations about future income streams.
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committing suicide generates an option value to waiting (i.e., postponing suicide)
when the uncertainty about the future is high - see Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg (2001), or Miao and Wang (2011).10
There have been several attempts to test these theories empirically, or at least
test whether suicides respond to economic incentives.11 The most common ap-
proach, adopted by the grand majority of the literature in question, has been to
look for correlations between suicides and current socioeconomic factors.12. A few
more recent papers use individual-level data on suicides.13 Either approach re-
stricts attention to contemporaneous correlations, which makes the identification
of a causal relationship between the socioeconomic variables and the suicide rate
difficult. Even though the respective results might be capturing, at least to some
10In Dixit and Pindyck (1994) suicide is approached from the perspective of a real option: under
conditions of irreversibility and uncertainty, an investor may opt for delaying undertaking an in-
vestment project while waiting to see what the future brings about. The authors argue that people
thinking of committing suicide have a similar choice to make. They are comparing the irreversible
action of suicide against the “option value” of staying alive (“delaying” suicide) and waiting to see
if the situation will improve. The model is extended in Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg (2001) to a
three-stage dynamic one, in which the agent is endowed with the suicide option at each stage. This
explains for instance the observed increase in youth suicide rates in recent US data by showing that,
under hyperbolic discounting and random-walk uncertainty, suicide risk changes non-monotonically
with age. In Miao and Wang (2011), the analysis is extended to the case in which the underlying
uncertainty is Knightian.
11See Goldsmith et al. (2002) for a wide and comprehensive overview of the literature on suicides,
and Chen et al. (2009) for a thorough survey of the empirical literature.
12These range over a diverse spectrum that includes social contagion (the phenomenon where one
suicide precipitates suicide attempts by others), income, income growth, income inequality, eco-
nomic growth or recession, education (as an important determinant of current as well as expected
future income), unemployment, age and gender, monetary incentives (e.g., insurance), female labor-
force participation, alcohol consumption, divorce and marriage rates, fertility rates, social isolation,
household size, population density and growth, migration rates, health and health care, cultural
factors/norms (such as ethnicity, religion, social capital, or the social sigma that suicide may carry),
homicide rates, geographical and climatic conditions, lifestyle, civil liberties and quality of govern-
ment. Typically, the data are aggregated over time and space, and a positive correlation between
suicides and adverse economic conditions emerges - see Ruhm (2000), Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg
(2001), Brainerd (2001), or Andres (2005).
13In Daly and Wilson (2009) suicides are shown to share the same socioeconomic determinants
as subjective measures of wellbeing. In Daly, Wilson, and Johnson (2013) the likelihood of suicide,
which is taken to be a choice variable that depends on the present and expected future utility,
is shown to decrease with own income but increase with reference-group income, highlighting the
importance of relative status. See also Daly et al. (2011) as a related paper.
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degree, the forward-looking behavior of the underlying theoretical framework, they
cannot rule out reverse causality.
And, to make matters worse, it takes but the reformulation of Durkheim’s conjec-
tures (recall footnote 4 above) in Pope (1976) to establish that economic conditions
are often difficult to disentangle from their sociological correlates. Consider for ex-
ample the relation between unemployment and suicide risk. It could well be that
individuals who suffer from (unobserved) mental disorders tend on average to be also
less productive. But, as pointed out in Stack (1982), it could also be that we can
relate suicide with unemployment rates by viewing the unemployed as “anomic,”
because of low incomes that cause a gap between goals and means, as well as “ego-
istic,” because of the severing of ties to co-workers. Moreover, it is often even more
difficult to disentangle the effect of socioeconomic factors from that of psychopatho-
logical ones. For instance, those suffering from mental problems might perceive their
socioeconomic conditions as bad (e.g., depressed people may be less hopeful about
future income and employment prospects) precisely because they suffer from mental
problems.
Moreover, the data itself might fail to accurately capture the underlying latent
variable of interest, utility. One one hand, when survey questions are deployed to
elicit information about individuals’ subjective “states” (feelings, attitudes, opin-
ions, beliefs, etc.), they introduce systematic as well as non-systematic measure-
ment errors - making it in turn difficult to compare answers across individuals or
over time. On the other hand, when non-subjective, outcome-based data (e.g., on
unemployment, crime, obesity, mortality, status, or the consumption of positional
goods) is used, it tends to embody also many potential determinants of suicide that
are unrelated to preferences.14
14It could well be that none of the factors listed in footnote 12 above is related to preferences
directly. On top of that, these factors will typically operate concomitantly, and in different direc-
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Having these concerns in mind, in what follows we do not deploy measures of
current economic conditions to test for the existence of a rationalizable component
in suicides. Our identification strategy hinges instead upon changes in current ex-
pectations about future conditions - changes brought about by new information that
renders certain future outcomes more probable than before, without altering one’s
current wellbeing. Our focus is on changes in expectations due to “good” news.
We exploit the fact that collective sentence reductions (pardons) in Italy often lead
to massive releases of prisoners. More importantly, they are usually preceded by
prolonged parliamentary activity (legislative proposals, discussion, voting in sub-
committees, etc.) that inmates seem to follow closely.15
The contribution of the present paper is to use legislative proposals for collective
pardons during the period 2002-2015 to measure changes in the inmates’ expecta-
tions about the length of their sentences, and to show that suicide rates tend to be
significantly lower when pardons are proposed in the Italian Chamber of Deputies or
Senate. We also provide empirical evidence that the parliamentary activity features
prominently in Italian news media, and anecdotal evidence that the relevant news
spread quickly within the prison walls by means of a dedicated radio station.
Our findings indicate that, amongst inmates in Italian prisons, the average deci-
sion to commit suicide does depend upon current expectations about an anticipated
tions with respect to their effects on suicide rates. For a detailed discussion of these concerns see
Daly and Wilson (2009) and Chen et al. (2009).
15New information about future conditions may generally reflect not only “good” but also “bad”
news. Within the context of prisons, the typical profile of suicide that criminologists and psy-
chologists have tried to build shows that “bad” news often lead to extreme self-harming behavior.
Despite lack of data and small-sample issues, their research has concluded, among other things, that
the period around the time of a court appearance is associated with high suicide risk amongst pre-
trial inmates, especially when a guilty verdicts and harsh sentences are anticipated. For sentenced
prisoners, on the other hand, negative legal dispositions (such as loss of an appeal or the denial of
parole) may act as triggers for suicide - see Liebling (1995), Liebling (1999), Wicks (1972), Hayes
(1995), as well as WHO (2000). Unfortunately, the very nature of the test in the present paper
precludes the study of a direct effect of “bad” news. For, more often than not, proposals that are
expected to be unsuccessful are not even brought to the parliament floor, but rather kept on hold
indefinitely. In Section 5.5 we devise an indirect way of measuring bad news.
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release. We estimate that one additional pardon proposal reduces the number of
suicides in the subsequent two or three months by about 10% over a period of two
to three months. When we measure the effects in terms of news coverage about such
proposals, we find that one standard deviation increase in the number of good news
reduce the number of suicides by about 18% over a period of two months. As a
placebo test, we also find that future proposals, which are thus not yet known to the
inmates, do not induce any changes in suicidal behavior - a result that alleviates in
addition concerns about reverse causality. These findings necessitate that more often
than not the underlying decision-making process has at a minimum some component
which does respond to informational incentives, and can be thus rationalized.16
In an ideal world we would test the relation between individual expectations
about future pardons and the individual decision to commit suicide. More precisely,
whether prisoners, whose own remaining sentence is most likely to be significantly
reduced by a pardon, are the ones least likely to commit suicide during periods of
increased parliamentary activity on pardon proposals.17 In the real world, being as
always constrained by the unavailability of the perfect data, we cannot but resort to
the study of aggregates - in our case the suicide rate and, hence, the average decision
to commit suicide.
Regarding this decision, the identification strategy in the present paper has two
major advantages stemming, respectively, from the context and the instrument of
16It should be noted that our findings do not by any means render the decision to commit suicide
rational per se. They do point out, however, that some of its constituting components may be
rational. As an assertion, this has been made before in the literature albeit in decision-making
contexts that differ sharply from the one under consideration here. See DellaVigna (2009) for an
overview of decision-making situations that reflect potential departures from perfect rationality, yet
in which the agents do respond to informational incentives. See also Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova
(2009) and Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014) for another use of collective pardons as a policy
instrument - to identify deterrence and incapacitation, respectively.
17For instance, an optimal test would be to regress the probability of a prisoner committing
suicide on an interaction term between the number of pardon proposals in recent months and the
length of the prisoner’s remaining sentence.
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our test. Since within the prison environment information about parliamentary
activity on pardon proposals cannot exert any systematic change in the inmates’
living conditions (other than through changes in expectations about future condi-
tions) while the access to this information is unlikely to vary systematically across
prisoners (at least as far as the potential determinants of suicide are concerned),
pardon proposals are an exogenous instrument for assigning subjects to changes in
expectations. Equally importantly, since almost all prisoners can expect to be el-
igible for sentence reduction under a potential pardon while all of them ought to
regard their sentence being reduced as a desirable outcome, pardon proposals can
be used as an instrument for positive changes in expectations without significant
loss of generality with respect to the well-known issues that arise when effects are
aggregated across subjects.18
As usual, however, one concern is that our evidence might be consistent also with
explanations that have nothing to do with the suicidal prisoners’ current expecta-
tions about an anticipated release. Alternative hypotheses as to why suicide rates
and pardon proposals might be related to each other are laid out in Section 3 and
tested in Sections 4 and 5. Our tests exploit the findings that suicide rates in the
Italian prisons are related to past and present, but not future, activity on pardon
proposals in the Italian parliament. The correlation in question is negative. The
tests account in addition for the way the suicide rate in prisons responded to the
amnesty law of August 2006 (the only actual pardon in our sample), as well as for
the fact that all of the alternative explanations operate at some level through the
18The first such issue that comes to mind is the so-called “ecological fallacy:” the problem,
described formally in Hanan (1958) (where the term was coined to emphasize a critical review of
Durkheim’s empirical methodology), that correlations computed from data on aggregated variables
(group means, proportions, etc.) are often not valid estimates for the correlations that would have
been obtained from individual data. The issue arises whenever the aggregation obscures significant
heterogeneity in individual correlations. This cannot be the case, at least for the sign of individual
correlations, under our implicit assumption that all (or almost all) prisoners dislike staying in prison.
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current conditions in prison. Our proxy for prison conditions is overcrowding and,
using province-level data on prison suicides, we show that if anything our results are
even stronger when controlling for prison overcrowding. The next section describes
our quasi-experimental setup while Section 6 concludes.
2 Collective Pardons
2.1 The Legislative Process
The policy instrument we will use to measure changes in the prisoners’ current expec-
tations about their future conditions are legislative proposals for collective pardons
in the Italian Parliament (Amnistie e Indulti). These are sentence reductions, typi-
cally by 2-3 years, for crimes committed before the law gets passed, and lead to the
immediate release of all inmates whose remaining sentence is less than the reduction
itself. For a collective pardon to become Italian law it has to be proposed first by
a member of parliament and then assigned to a parliamentary committee (Com-
missione Parlamentare). From there, once the proposal has been discussed and
appropriately prepared, it is sent to the parliamentary chamber that currently sets
the agenda. To be approved, the proposal has to be voted without further changes
in both chambers of parliament, the Camera dei Deputati and the Senato della
Repubblica, by an absolute majority of two-thirds (Constitutional Law 6/1992).19
Collective pardons in Italy have not been part of any systematic prison reform.
In the recent past especially, they rather represent isolated and ad-hoc attempts
to address pressing problems of prison overcrowding.20 In this sense, legislative
19Before 1992, a simple legislative majority sufficed for collective amnesties and pardons to become
Italian law. Notice also that collective pardon proposals can be made in addition by the government,
the regional councils (Consigli Regionali), and the citizens themselves (as long as at least 50,000
signatures are collected so as to constitute an iniziativa legislativa popolare). More often than not,
however, and in line with most legislative proposals in Italy, collective pardon proposals are initiated
in parliament.
20To give a historical perspective, between the unification of Italy in 1865 and Mussolini’s defeat
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proposals for collective pardons reflect by themselves good news for people that are
behind bars. For they are not only necessary for an amnesty law to be passed, but
their very number is correlated with the likelihood that this happens.
This is depicted vividly in Figure 1 with respect to the period 1980-2013.21
Shortly before an amnesty law gets passed (an event shown by a vertical line in
the figure), the number of proposals for such a law increases dramatically.22 More
specifically, between January 1980 and December 2013, the introduction of at least
one pardon proposal in the Italian Parliament in a given month increases the log-
odds that an amnesty law is passed by 220% (SE = 0.94). Each proposal by itself
increases the log-odds by 58% (SE = 0.12).23
Equally importantly for the purposes of our study, pardon proposals are noisy
signals of parliamentary activity on collective pardons - for they do not make it
into law all the time. In June and July of 2000, the year of the Great Jubilee, Pope
John Paul II asked policy makers to pardon inmates while visiting the Roman prison
of Regina Coeli, one of the largest in the country. This led to a surge in pardon
proposals. Nevertheless, no actual law was passed and in November 2002 the Pope
went to visit the Italian Parliament asking again for a pardon. This led to a second
surge in proposals. Given how easy it was to predict the Pope’s request, the surge
actually anticipated his visit - exhibiting 4, 2, and 4 pardon proposals in September,
in 1943, there have been approximately 200 pardons or amnesties. Some of these were fiscal pardons
or amnesties for very specific crimes. Others were aimed at easing social tensions or magnifying the
royal family. Between 1945 and the present, however, approximately a dozen of collective clemency
acts have been passed. Initially, they were aimed at reconciling a politically-divided nation. More
recently, the main goal has been to alleviate severe overcrowding in prisons.
21For the period 1987-2001, our data on proposals has been gathered from the Italian Parliamen-
tary Library (Biblioteca della Camera dei Deputati). For more recent years, it was obtained from
the Italian Senate’s web site (www.senato.it). We are indebted to Tommaso Nannicini for providing
the former set of data.
22For example, the number of pardon proposals in the sample peaks at 6 and 12 in June and July
2006, respectively, anticipating the amnesty law of August 2006.
23The regression results in question are based on logistic regressions (preferred to linear probability
models as pardons are rare events). They are shown in Table A3 of the Appendix.
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October, and November 2002, respectively. Alas, again no amnesty law was passed.
There is also another reason rendering pardon proposals noisy signals of par-
liamentary activity on collective pardons. From the Italian Parliamentary Library
(Biblioteca della Camera dei Deputati) and the Senate’s TESEO search engine one
can obtain the last recorded status of each pardon proposal. Even though propos-
als can be in one of 9 possible statuses, Table 2 shows that, no matter how far
back in time proposals go, more than 50% are still recorded as either assigned to a
parliamentary committee or under discussion in one.
Eventually, only a handful of proposals ever make it to the voting stage. It is
much more common for a proposal to be put on hold, or (one might say) forgotten
in some drawer. As a result, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for inmates (as
well as researchers) to know the point in time when a given proposal finally fails to
make it into law. Between 2001 and 2015 only in one occasion were proposals voted
down - on January 12, 2006. The proposals that were dismissed on that day had
been on hold for several months, some even for several years.
2.2 The Media Coverage of Proposals
Claiming descriptive evidence of a relationship between pardon proposals and changes
in suicide rates assumes at a minimum that inmates follow the parliamentary activ-
ity on pardons from within the prison confines. To corroborate this, we gathered
data on news regarding pardons and amnesties from the main Italian news agency,
Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA), the second most important Italian
press agency (AdnKronos), as well as the newspapers Il Corriere della Sera and La
Stampa. We also downloaded data on the distribution of searches on www.google.it
based on the word “Indulto” using Google Trends.24
24Table A2 in the Appendix lists the data sources, and the period for which the data are available.
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Using the month in which the individual news or Google searches that cover
pardons or amnesties appeared - the same level of aggregation we will be using in
our main regressions, - one observes that news and searches are highly correlated with
the timing of the pardon proposals (see Table 3).25 A strong correlation emerges
also when comparing the time-series of the number of proposals with that of the
number of individual news or Google searches (see Figure 2).
The data from ANSA are particularly rich being based on their internal database
DEA (Documentazione Elettronica ANSA).26 During the period 2002-2015, there
are on average 71 news items per month about Italian pardons and amnesties, and
ANSA would also produce photos and videos that media outlets can purchase. The
agency is known to follow Italian parliamentary activity like no other media source,
while all of the important Italian newspapers, TV stations, and radio stations are
registered users of the ANSA wire service, using its news feed to plan their own
coverage.
The time series of ANSA news on pardons is highly dependent on pardon pro-
posals. This is shown in Figure 3 where we separate months depending on whether
there were some proposals, and follow the lags and leads in the number of news items
about pardons. While the distribution of news around months without a proposal is
flat, the number of news about pardons increases as one gets closer to the month the
proposal is presented, and drops steadily over the following months. The increased
media coverage seem to last for about 2 to 3 months.
Evidently, pardon proposals feature prominently in the Italian news. To con-
clude the validation of our assumption, it remains to establish whether the news
25As a robustness check, Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix present the entire scatter plot
diagrams for the pardon proposals against the ANSA news in levels and logs, respectively. Either
shows clearly that the correlation is not driven merely by the proposals between June and August
2006, the period that immediately preceded the amnesty law of 2006.
26ANSA is one of the leading world news agencies together with Reuters, Associated Press, Agence
France Presse, and Deutsche Presse-Agentur.
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make it into prisons. While data on inmates’ use of news media are not available,
conversations with Francesco Morelli and Riccardo Arena, the respective directors
of the monthly prison magazine Ristretti Orizzonti and the weekly prison radio pro-
gram Radio Carcere, revealed that either medium covers extensively any news about
pardon proposals, and that inmates are well aware of such news. Moreover, news
inside prisons are likely to travel very fast by word of mouth.27
Later, in Section 5.5, we are going to explicitly test the importance of such
information transmission, by looking at the effect the news in question have directly
on suicides.
2.3 The Expected Pardon “Treatment”
Pardon proposals being our measure of “good” news, it is important to understand
how favorable and for whom amongst the Italian prisoners the corresponding event is
likely to be. The period under consideration (January 2002 to March 2015) saw only
one amnesty law, on 1 August 2006, and individual-level data of inmates pardoned
on that date shows the average reduction in the length of their sentence to be 15
months.28 This means that on average 45% of one’s total sentence was pardoned.
Figure 4 depicts the relative frequency of the length of the total initial sentence
amongst the Italian prisoners on 1 August 2006, and the fraction of this length that
was pardoned on that date (either variable as a function of one’s total sentence). On
average, an inmate whose total sentence did not exceed 4 years (48 months) saw it
being reduced by half. Inmates with longer remaining sentences had their sentence
reduced by a smaller fraction. But, on average, this fraction almost never falls below
27Ristretti Orizzonti (Limited Horizons) was established in 1998 while Radio Carcere (Radio
Prison) has been broadcasted since 2002 by Radio Radicale (Radical Radio), a well-known Italian
radio station. Ristretti Orizzonti ’s website has about 4,000 unique visits per day.
28Our data on suicides in Italian prisons goes back to only January 2002. As a result, our study
of the effect of pardon proposals on suicides refers to the period between January 2002 and March
2015.
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10%, while the measure of these cases in the total population decreases sharply as
the remaining sentence length increases. Based on the August 2006 amnesty law,
we may safely assert that pardons induce sizable reductions in one’s remaining time
in prison.
Regarding which inmates in particular are likely to receive a sentence reduction,
Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014) show that pardons generate almost no selection:
inmates are released almost indiscriminately based on just their residual sentence.
There is obviously some uncertainty about receiving a pardon. As a rule, and to
prevent abnormal increases in crime just prior to the introduction of an amnesty
law, collective pardons in Italy apply only to crimes committed up to a specific
date - usually three to six months before the date on which the law is signed. As
a result, for those who happen to have committed a crime too close to the latter
date, the pardon is likely to bring nothing but the psychological burden of seeing
their fellow inmates released while they stay behind. Nevertheless, based again
on the August 2006 amnesty law, many inmates ought to expect to be released
immediately following an amnesty law, whereas the vast majority of them ought to
expect a significant anticipation of their release date.
3 Suicides in Prison
The yearly suicide rate in Italian prisons is close to 10 per 10,000 inmates. This is
about 10 times higher than that amongst the male population, slightly above the
average across the prisons of other European countries, and twice the current average
suicide rate across the U.S. penitentiary institutions. As the number of inmates
fluctuates around 60,000, there are about 60 suicides per year (i.e., on average 5
per month) generating a relatively noisy evolution of suicides (the demeaned and
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deseasonalized suicide rate is shown in Figure 6).29
The relatively high suicide rates in Italian prisons may seem paradoxical in the
face of the claim that the decision to commit suicide exhibits a rational component.
After all, if being imprisoned is very likely to lead to the ultimate penalty, a rational
agent should have foreseen and avoided this contingency at all costs - including not
becoming a criminal in the first place. At first glance, this seems to suggest that
suicides in Italian prisons could be driven by error, in the sense that some criminals
might not be able to foresee how harsh prison conditions can be.
The apparent paradox may be explained also by the hypothesis that criminal
behavior reflects the choice to accept a gamble of high returns from crime against
committing suicide if apprehended and convicted. Theoretically, this hinges upon
the idea - formulated explicitly in Becker and Posner (2004) - that individuals assess
their current and expected future (lifetime) utility, and compare the resulting present
value of life to that of exit. For the vast majority of the population, the former value
never even nears the threshold defining the latter. For the marginal person, however,
the threshold in question is binding and the evaluation becomes critical.30
Following this line of thought, we may view suicide as revealing a choice made
by individuals who have examined the present value of continuing to live as opposed
to exiting, conditional on exogenous risk factors that reflect one’s assessment of
current and expected future utility. But within the closed environment of a prison,
there is no reason for the exogenous risk factors in question to vary systematically
across individuals. Taking this view, therefore, means that prison suicide data have
the advantage of measuring directly, through revealed preference, the assessment of
expected lifetime utility in a systematic way.
29Section 4 provides a detailed description of the data.
30For the marginal individual, moreover, it is precisely the gambles offering a large gain albeit
with a small chance that are particularly attractive - see Becker and Posner (2004), pp.10-11.
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There are a few possible explanations for the focal relation of the present study:
the one between the expectations in question and the observed parliamentary activ-
ity on pardon proposals. They amount to different hypotheses regarding the under-
lying latent mechanism via which inmates perceive the parliamentary activity as a
signal for a possible improvement in their living environment and future prospects.31
Each hypothesis corresponds to a specific prediction as to how the suicide rate in
prison ought to respond to the parliamentary activity on pardon proposals, as well
as to whether or not the activity itself results in an actual amnesty law.
3.1 Forward-looking Hypotheses
The explanation that comes first to our minds is based upon the important role
uncertainty about the future plays on a decision such as whether or not to commit
suicide from the perspective of the option-value theory of investment. Namely, the
irreversibility of the act generates an option value to waiting (i.e., postponing suicide)
when the uncertainty about the future is high. Regarding the suicides under study
in particular, the possibility for receiving a significant anticipation of their release
in the near future could make (at least some) individuals who are currently at risk
to commit suicide willing to endure another unpleasant month or more in prison.
Their decisions are governed by what is called “Bernanke’s good news principle” in
Dixit (1992): the option value of continuing to live is determined primarily by the
31None of these hypotheses is meant to imply that psychopathological conditions do not matter
for suicides in prisons. The pertinent literature is large (see Fazel and Baillargeon (2011), Hayes
(1995), or Gvion and Apter (2011) to name but a few), albeit outside the scope of our analysis. For
our focus is upon the relation between the suicide rate in Italian prisons, on the one hand, and the
activity on pardon proposals and amnesty laws in the Italian parliament, on the other. Even though
the inmates’ psychopathological states could affect their assessment of expected lifetime utility - in
much the same way as they would affect their perceptions of current socioeconomic conditions (e.g.,
depressed people may be less hopeful about future income and employment prospects) - we see no
reason for this effect to be systematically related to the activity in parliament. We would expect
that inmates who suffer from serious psychopathological conditions are less responsive to “good
news from parliament” -which, if anything, would imply that our estimates ought to be biased
towards zero.
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potential for good news, which induces one to ride out bad periods.
In what follows, we will call this the “early-release hypothesis:” inmates perceive
news about parliamentary activity on pardon proposals as increased odds that they
will be released soon. This hypothesis would generate a negative correlation between
the suicide rate in prisons and pardon proposals to result from a time series where
suicides are observed with a lag relative to proposals.32
Furthermore, the hypothesis predicts an increase in the suicide rate following the
amnesty law of 2006. For the option-value theory leads also to the assertion that
suicide rates would be relatively high amongst individuals who recently experienced
“bad news.” Hence, with respect to the prisoners who do not qualify for pardon
under the law, inferring from the history of the parliamentary activity on pardon
proposals that another amnesty law will probably not be coming for some period,
they may well become more suicidal (see Figure 1)- especially, as they are also likely
to be envious of the other prisoners benefitting from the pardon (which would be in
line with evidence on relative comparisons, as in Daly, Wilson, and Johnson, 2013).
Perceiving parliamentary activity on pardon proposals as a signal for a possible
improvement in one’s future utility is by no means an exclusive characteristic of
the inmates who are at risk to commit suicide. Those who are not at risk could be
even more responsive in updating their expectations upwards when pardon proposals
increase. It could be that only the prisoners who are not at risk to commit suicide
are forward-looking in this respect. As this subset of inmates become more hopeful,
less angry, less prone to violence, the prison environment could turn less unpleasant
32Equally importantly for the purposes of the present study, the theoretical intuition behind the
hypothesis suggests that the correlation in question ought to be significant even though (or rather
precisely because) the suicide rate in question is small. As pointed out in Becker and Posner (2004),
the very fact that only a small fraction of the prisoners’ population commits suicide implies that the
inmates whose option value of waiting falls below the “exit” threshold are located in the extreme
left-hand tail of the distribution. As the extreme tails of most distributions are very sensitive
to changes in the mean, other things being equal, even moderate changes in the expected future
lifetime utility could have very large effects on the fraction of inmates that fall below the threshold.
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for all prisoners - including those who are at risk to commit suicide, and who might
as a result become less likely to do so.
There is yet another possible dimension in the relation between parliamentary
activity on pardon proposals and the inmates’ perceptions of their future living
conditions in prison. A prisoner’s improved expectations about the future may reflect
increased odds that poor conditions in prison (such as overcrowding for instance)
will be alleviated by the early release of others - even if an own early release is
improbable. This reasoning may apply also with respect to forward-looking behavior
by the prison guards and personnel, rather than the prisoners themselves. Following
a pardon proposal, guards may expect their working conditions to improve, becoming
consequently less stressed and nicer to the prisoners. This may have a concomitant
effect on the behavior of those inmates who are at risk to commit suicide.33
To accommodate either of the interpretations above, we will refer to this as
the “prison-environment hypothesis.”34 Similarly to the early-release hypothesis, it
implies a negative correlation between the suicide rate in prisons and pardon pro-
posals to result from a time series where suicides are observed with a lag relative
to proposals. Since the new hypothesis relates to suicides via the living conditions
in prisons the correlation in question ought to be larger in magnitude at more over-
crowded prisons. Equally importantly for the purposes of our study, the hypothesis
predicts a decrease in the suicide rate following the amnesty law of 2006. For, other
things being equal, the conditions in prisons ought to have become if anything better
shortly after August 2006.35
33Nothing in this reasoning prevents the behavior of the inmates who are at risk to commit suicide
to be also forward-looking. In conjunction even with the option-value theory, they may choose to
postpone suicide because of improved expectations due to the prospect of improved conditions in
prison (rather than that of their own release). Even this interpretation, however, points towards the
same correlational pattern between suicides, pardon proposals, and amnesty laws as that stemming
from the forward-looking behavior of the non-suicidal prisoners or the prison guards and personnel.
34We are indebted to an anonymous referee for bringing either interpretation to our attention.
35Regarding in particular the interpretation based upon the behavior of the non-suicidal inmates,
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3.2 Other Hypotheses
The conditions in prison may also affect the behavior of the inmates who are at risk
to commit suicide more directly and concurrently. It is rather well-established in
the relevant literature that overcrowding in prisons exerts severe adverse effects on
the psychological and behavioral well-being of inmates. Several studies suggest in
particular that overcrowding - by intensifying competition for resources, space, and
personal autonomy, increasing the potential for violence and victimization, or forcing
cell sharing with unknown and potentially unpredictable cohabitants - heightens the
stress of imprisonment and thus the likelihood of suicide.36
3.2.1 Prison overcrowding as trigger for suicides
Prison overcrowding is an issue in Italy, where many prisons routinely operate at
overcapacity. It often becomes political matter - to such an extent that parliamen-
tary activity on pardon proposals cannot but be viewed as politicians responding
to overcrowding conditions in prisons. Under this perspective, which will be called
henceforth the “overcrowding hypothesis,” we should expect a positive correlation
between the suicide rate in prisons and pardon proposals to result from a time series
where proposals are observed with a lag relative to suicides. We are to expect also
a decline in the suicide rate following the amnesty law of 2006 with its concomitant
alleviation of prison overcrowding.
in contrast to the early-release hypothesis, the adverse psychological effects of not qualifying for
pardon under the law are of limited import here. For the issue concerns inmates who have en-
tered the prison not long before August 2006. As recent entrants, they are less likely to have
established themselves high enough within the prisoners’ hierarchy to be affecting dramatically the
living conditions of other prisoners.
36Additional explanations point towards the fact that access to rehabilitation, education, and
other beneficial programs are bound to be more limited in overcrowded settings. This may
add in turn to inmate idleness and frustration - thus, strengthening the likelihood of suicide.
For detailed discussions of the theory and literature on prison overcrowding see Mullen (1985),
Huey and McNulty (2005), and Sharkey (2010).
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3.2.2 Prison overcrowding as preventive force
Another commonly-held view in the literature points out the difficulty of commit-
ting suicide in multiple-occupancy cells.37 More precisely, as prisons become more
crowded and the number of inmates who reside in single cells decreases, cell sharing
- by facilitating companionship and observation - may actually be a preventive force
against suicides. We will be referring to this view as the “less-alone hypothesis.”
Maintaining the assumption that parliamentary activity on pardon proposals de-
picts the politicians’ response to overcrowding in prisons, this suggests a negative
correlation between suicides and pardon proposals to result from a time series where
proposals are observed with a lag relative to suicides. This hypothesis predicts also
an increase in the suicide rate following the amnesty law of 2006.
3.2.3 Unintentional suicides
Another relevant theme from the literature on suicides in prisons examines the link-
ages between attempted and actual suicides. In prison, attempted suicides tend to
be 10 times more than actual ones. Such a multiple cannot but be related to the
fact that committing a successful suicide is not the easiest of tasks, especially in
overcrowded prisons. It may also depict though (desperate) attempts by inmates
to induce their transfer to the hospital, to a different cell, or even their eventual
release. Since penitentiary authorities are aware of these incentives, the attempts
themselves need to be credible - which intensifies the risk of them turning into ac-
tual suicides. We will refer to the possibility for such unintentional suicides as the
37Evidence that suicidal attempts are more likely to fail in multiple-occupancy units com-
pared to single cells or cells with few inmates is shown in Spinellis and Themeli (1997),
Franklin, Franklin, and Pratt (2006), Anson (1984), or Anno (1985). In the latter study for ex-
ample, out of 38 suicides in Texan facilities during an almost six-year period, 37 lived alone in
single cells.
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“hyper-rational suicides hypothesis.”38 Clearly, if parliamentary activity on par-
don proposals depicts the politicians’ response to overcrowding (or, more generally,
a sharp deterioration of conditions) in prisons, this induces the same correlational
pattern between suicides, pardon proposals, and the amnesty law of 2006 as the
overcrowding hypothesis.
To fix ideas about the hypotheses above, the following table summarizes the
respective predictions regarding the correlational patterns between the suicide rate
in Italian prisons, on the one hand, and the news about pardon proposals in the
Italian parliament, the actual amnesty law of August 2006, or the extent of prison
overcrowding on the other.
Table 1: Hypotheses and Predicted Correlational Patterns
∆St/∆PPt+k ∆St|2006 Amnesty Law
Early Release -ve +ve
for some k < 0
Prison Environment [-ve] [-ve]
for some k < 0
Overcrowding/ [+ve] [-ve]
Hyper-rational Suicides for some k > 0
Less Alone [-ve] [+ve]
for some k > 0
Note: ∆St and ∆PPt depict, respectively, the changes in the suicide rate
and the number of pardon proposals for month t. The brackets mean that
the corresponding effect ought to be stronger under prison overcrowding.
38Our terminology here is inspired by Kaminski (2004), where it is argued that the stakes can be
so high in prison to render “hyper-rational” even what appears to be inhuman and bizarre behavior.
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4 Data and Preliminary Evidence
4.1 Data and Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy uses detailed information on the timing of (i) actual sui-
cides in Italian prisons, and (ii) proposals for collective pardons in the Italian Senate
or House of Representatives, over a 13-year period (2002-2015). We obtained the
data on the prison population from the Italian Penitentiary Administration (DAP)
while that on the legislative proposals for collective pardons can be found on the
Italian Senate’s TEsauro SEnato per l’Organizzazione dei documenti parlamentari
(TESEO) database (available at www.senato.it). Regarding the dates of individual
deaths, our data comes from the research group Ristretti Orizzonti (www.ristretti.it)
- unfortunately, it does not include any information about the actual or expected
length of sentence of the respective inmates.39
As pointed out in Section 2.1, pardons are nationwide policies while only a few
criminals would not benefit from sentence reductions in a typical pardon. This
implies that any individual information about inmates who committed suicide is
orthogonal to the dates in which pardon proposals are presented. Equally impor-
tantly for the purposes of our study, before making it into law pardon proposals are
not inducing any changes in prison condition by themselves - which dismisses again
possible threats of omitted-variable bias.
For these reasons, the main variation we are going to exploit is temporal: we will
compare the suicide rates between the periods of intensive parliamentary activity on
pardons and the periods when pardons are not on the table. To this end, given that
news about pardon proposals seem to spread over a period of a few months (recall
39The same data have been used by Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2011) to look at the re-
lationship between prison conditions (as proxied by deaths in prison) and recidivism (see also
Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich, 2003). The official statistics on prison deaths are only available at
the yearly level, but the Ristretti Orizzonti data tracks the yearly official statistics on suicides and
natural deaths very closely (see Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix).
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Figure 3), and might take even more time to spread by word of mouth within the
prison walls, we aggregate the data at the monthly level. This empirical strategy
identifies the average effects of pardon proposals on suicide rates. Nevertheless, one
might expect these effects to be different according to prison conditions as well as
with the number of years the proposals are supposed to pardon.40
Regarding the former consideration, the single most relevant prison condition is
certainly overcrowding. Since we have information about the prison where inmates
committed suicide, we can match such a prison to its overcrowding status. There
are 166 prisons in Italy, and the data on overcrowding at the prison level is available
from the Italian Ministry of Justice (www.giustizia.it) biannually starting in 2010.
To match this with the Ristretti Orizzonti data (on which many prison names are
not as accurate as in the judicial statistics) on deaths, we aggregate the prison-level
data at the province level for all provinces that had at least one suicide event - there
are 93 such provinces in total.41
The relevant statistics at the province level are shown at the bottom of Table 4.
The average overcrowding rate during the period 2010-2015 is 141%, with more than
50% of all provinces exhibiting an overcrowding rate that is larger than 150%. Even
though there are too few pardon proposals during the period, there is little variation
(just 30%) in prison overcrowding within provinces over time. Most of the variation
(61%) is cross-sectional, with the rest (9%) being driven by the variation over time
that remains the same across provinces. Given this, it is without significant loss
40Even though a successful pardon proposal will anticipate the date of release for almost all
inmates, the corresponding effect on expectations is likely to be larger for those inmates with
residual sentences that are lower than the proposed reduction in sentences - for they would expect
to be released immediately. Unfortunately, information on residual sentences is not available at the
prison level.
41The aggregation of the prison-level data at the province level is only minor in extent since there
are on average less than 2 prisons per province. It is meant to avoid certain data-consistency issues
at the prison level (given that during the period 2010-2015 some prisons were closed, some changed
name, while some new ones were opened).
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of generality to average the information about overcrowding across the 2010-2015
period before matching it with the data on suicides for the entire period 2002-2015.
Over the 158 months of the latter period, according to the summary statistics
in Table 4, there are on average more than 4 suicides and about 1.5 natural deaths
per month.42 On average there is also one proposal every three months, with a
tendency for minor and minority parties to present more proposals (something we
do revisit later). Finally, with respect to the number of years that proposals are
supposed to pardon, the mode and median is 3. In Section A.1 of the Appendix
we test explicitly whether the content of pardons proposals matters, and we find
that the semi-elasticities are more negative the larger the number of years to be
pardoned.43
4.2 Preliminary Evidence
Comparing suicide rates between periods with and without a sizeable parliamentary
activity on pardons reveals important differences. Figure 5 shows that the average
suicide rate is close to 9 per 10,000 inmates when no proposals were presented in
parliament over the last 3 months, while it is close to 7 per 10,000 when at least 2
proposals were presented. The figure shows also a preliminary placebo test, using
natural deaths rates as the main outcome. While some of these deaths might be
responding to the possibility of an early release, overall we expect smaller or no
changes. The natural deaths are less frequent than suicides; more importantly,
there are no significant differences across the periods with intensive parliamentary
activity on pardons and the periods when no such activity takes place.
42There are also another 1.5 deaths per month that cannot be classified. Nevertheless, this does
not affect our analysis (see in particular Section 5.4) as they are unlikely to be homicides. Notice
for instance that, during the period 2000-2008, there were a total of 8 homicides or 0.07 homicides
per month.
43Interestingly, other dimensions of the proposals (e.g. the political affiliation of the proponents)
matter less.
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Controlling for seasonality in suicides and for August 2006, the month that
the amnesty law was passed, reduces the confidence intervals of our estimates and
slightly lowers the suicide rate when proposals are presented. The main reason is
that August 2006, the month that saw inmates been released in large numbers,
coincides with a spike in the suicide rate. This can be seen in Figure 6 which depicts
the simple time-series of suicides and a moving-average of pardon proposals. The
vertical bar indicates August 2006 at which point either series spikes. The spike can
be taken as preliminary evidence against both the “prison-environment” as well as
the “overcrowding” (and, thus, also the “hyper-rational suicides”) hypotheses, but
in favor of the “early-release” and “less-alone” ones. For, while prison conditions
most likely improved following the massive release of prisoners, the inmates are those
who did not get released themselves (amongst whom many did not even receive a
sentence reduction) and had to cope with the psychological burden of seeing their
fellow inmates released, as well as face the historical regularity that following an
actual pardon the next one might be a decade or more away.
5 Regression Analysis
5.1 Benchmark Results
Given that we have only anecdotal evidence about how information flows into pris-
ons, we proceed with the deployment of regression analysis to test whether pardon
proposals lead to significant differences in suicide rates. Since legislative proposals
are bound to be orthogonal to any individual characteristic that might affect an
inmate’s suicidal behavior, parsimonious regression specifications are sufficient.
Monthly suicide counts are best modeled using Poisson regressions, where the
exposure or offset variable is the total prison population (which in Italy is measured
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by semi-annual census). Including the prison population as the offset variable, we
are de facto modeling the suicide rate and not just the counts. We are implicitly
assuming, thus, that suicides are approximately proportional to the prison popula-
tion. Towards the end of this section, when using province-level data, we are going
to take into account that the prison population influences the overcrowding status of
the prisons, potentially introducing some nonlinearities between prison population
and suicides.
Our estimation is based on Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (i.e., Poisson with
robust standard errors, clustered at the monthly level when using province-level
data).44 This is consistent as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified,
even if the true data-generating process is not Poisson. To control for seasonality in
suicidal behavior, our regressions include monthly fixed effects. To account, more-
over, for the fact that the actual pardon in August 2006 might be “bad news” for
those inmates who did not receive a sentence reduction, each regression includes also
a dummy equal to one for August 2006.
Table 5 presents the results from different specifications, which control for dif-
ferent lags and leads of the number of proposals. The first specification (Column
1) is the most demanding: it controls for the number of proposals over a six-month
window around (from t− 3, three months preceding, to t+ 3, three months follow-
ing) a given month. While only the semi-elasticity on month t − 2 is significantly
different from zero, all current and past number of proposals have semi-elasticities
that are between -2.5% and -4.4%. More importantly, the p-value on the joint test
that all the coefficients on the lagged variables are equal to zero is always below
44The expected number of suicides in month t is given by E [St|PPt] = Le
θ
⊺
PPt , where L repre-
sents the prison population (measured via semi-annual census during the period under study) while
PPt the array of pardon proposals per month during a six-month window around the month t. The
coefficients can be interpreted as simple semi-elasticities: θk = E [St|PPt]
−1 ∂E [St|PPt] /∂PPt+k
where k = −3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3.
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5%. The sum of the semi-elasticities implies that a single pardon proposal during
the preceding three months reduces the number of suicides by about 14%. In sharp
contrast, the coefficients on the leads are very close to zero - even when including
only one lead (t+ 1) the coefficient is basically zero.
Starting with Column 3 of the table, therefore, our regressions ignore the pardon
proposals from the lead months. The same applies also for the proposals from
the current month. Even though this makes little difference for the results, the
deployment of only lags in the specifications reduces the concern of reverse causality
- which would bias the estimated coefficient upwards if members of congress were
more likely to propose collective pardons when suicide rates are particularly high.45
For all Columns 3-7, the two model selection criteria at the bottom of the table,
the Akaike Information Criterium (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterium
(BIC), are noteworthy. They establish that the most preferred model uses just the
sum of proposals presented in the preceding two or three months (Columns 6 and
7). The coefficients in Columns 6-7 indicate that each pardon proposal during the
preceding two [resp. three] months reduces the number of suicides by about 5.8%
[resp. 4.3%]. Finally, in all specifications of Table 5, the coefficient on the August
2006 pardon is always significant and positive - approximately equal to two. That is,
amongst those inmates who had to remain behind bars while nearly 20,000 of their
fellow inmates were released following the amnesty law of August 2006, suicide rates
were 200% higher than expected, despite a significant reduction in overcrowding.
In line with the preliminary evidence, our results are corroborative for the “early-
release” but detrimental for all other hypotheses. More precisely, the fact that
suicides in prison fall with the number of pardon proposals presented in the preceding
two or three months but do not respond to future proposals is completely at odds
45Using just lags accounts also for the possibility that it might take on average several days for
the information about legislative proposals to reach all inmates within the prison walls.
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with both the “less-alone” as well as the “overcrowding” (and, thus, also the “hyper-
rational suicides”) explanation. It does not go against the “prison-environment”
hypothesis, but the fact that the suicide rate increases following an actual amnesty
law certainly does. In sharp contrast, either fact is consistent with the “early-release”
hypothesis.
In the comparison of the “early-release” and “prison-environment” hypotheses
our evidence thus far is based but upon a single event, the actual pardon of August
2006. In what follows (see Section 5.3), we enhance significantly the power of our
test by exploiting the variation in prison conditions (namely, prison overcrowding)
across different provinces. Before proceeding, however, we must examine first the
robustness of our analysis.
5.2 Robustness Checks
To this end, Table 6 presents several checks. Column 1 shows our benchmark regres-
sions: the Poisson model with the sum of proposals in the preceding two months.46
In Column 2, we model instead the log of the suicide rate (loosing 6 observations due
to months without any suicides). The results are extremely similar. They remain
so if one adds year fixed effects (Column 3) or does not control for exposure in the
Poisson model (Column 4). Similarly, the results do not change if one includes the
monthly suicide rate of the entire Italian male population between the ages of 18
and 64 (Column 5) - which shows that we are not just capturing an overall trend in
suicides that happens to be correlated with the presence of pardon proposals.47
Another important robustness check is depicted in Column 6. It consists of
including past suicide rates, so as to control for reverse causality. More precisely,
46The respective coefficients in Table 6 differ slightly from those in Table 5 because we have 156
observations in the former but 152 in the latter.
47We were able to find the monthly suicide rate of the Italian male population between the ages
of 18 and 64 for about half of the total number of months in our sample.
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if past suicide rates were correlated with past proposals, the coefficient on past
proposals might just capture autocorrelation between present and past suicide rates.
However, this does not seem to be the case. The autoregressive coefficient is precisely
estimated as being close to zero, while the coefficient on past proposals is only slightly
lower than before. Column 7 on the other hand tests a specification in differences for
the number of pardon proposals. While short-term changes (for example, the number
of proposals in the month tminus the number in the previous month) have a negative
but negligible effect,48 more long-term changes in the number of pardon proposals,
namely the variable 1/3
(∑
2
k=0
PPt−k −
∑
5
k=3
PPt−k
)
, are statistically significant:
the suicide rate in a given month tends to decrease when the average number of
proposals increases between the two most recent quarters. Either observation is
consistent with the previous evidence, as well as with the view that the effects of
pardon proposals materialize but also persist over the span of a few months. Finally,
Column 8 restricts the sample to only the first 53 months - that is, to the period
before the August 2006 pardon. Focussing the analysis on pardon proposals that
were eventually successful leads to even larger reductions in suicides.
5.3 Overcrowding and Pardon Proposals
Our evidence of a relationship between pardon proposals in the Italian parliament
and suicide rates in Italian prisons is far more than merely descriptive. Nevertheless,
it could be that the observed correlation is driven by some other underlying factor
to which both pardon proposals and suicides in prison respond. The first such factor
that comes to mind has to do with living conditions in prisons - in particular, over-
crowding.49 While most Italian prisons tend to be overcrowded, there is considerable
48The results are not shown here but are available from the authors upon request.
49Recall our two dimensional interpretation of the “prison-environment” hypothesis in Section
3.1. That the second dimension should relate directly to prison overcrowding is immediate. As
for the first dimension, it relies fundamentally upon the premise that the (aggressive) behavior of
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geographical variation, even when averaging over the 5-year period 2010-2015 of our
data on prison overcrowding. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 7. The left
panel shows instead the geographical variation in the average suicide rate over the
period 2002-2015 of our data on suicides. Comparing the two panels, if anything,
the shades of gray appear to be negatively correlated.
In Table 7, we replicate the Poisson time-series analysis using province-level
panel data. The dependent variable is now the number of monthly suicides in a
given province, while the main variable of interest is the number of pardon propos-
als over the past two or three months. Since the number of proposals is the same
across provinces in a given month, we cluster the standard errors at the monthly
level. The main advantage of using province-level data is that we can assess whether
overcrowding influences our results, either as an omitted variable or by generating
heterogeneity in the effects. We deploy two measures of overcrowding, the overcrowd-
ing rate (the number of inmates in the province over the capacity of the province’s
prisons), and a dichotomous variable equal to one when the overcrowding rate in
the province is above the national median (which corresponds to an overcrowding
rate of 150%).
Our regressions include either one of the two measures of overcrowding or province
fixed-effects, on the one hand, and the interaction between overcrowding and par-
don proposals on the other. When using the overcrowding rate, we interact the
demeaned rate so that the main effect measures how proposals influence suicides
when prisons have an average degree of overcrowding. The coefficients show mainly
that overcrowding i) reduces the suicide rate, and ii) attenuates the effect of par-
don proposals on suicides (albeit most coefficients on the interaction terms are not
certain inmates affects decisively the living conditions of others. The latter relation is obviously
to be enhanced in overcrowded prisons - where the prison authorities’ capacity for supervision gets
stressed to the limit while the competition amongst inmates for resources, space, and personal
autonomy intensifies dramatically.
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significantly different from zero). The first result leans against the “overcrowding”
(and, thus, also the “hyper-rational suicides”) hypothesis but in favor of the “less-
alone” one. It indicates that suicidal attempts are more likely to fail in multiple
occupancy units compared to single cells or cells with few inmates. The second
result, in agreement with our previous evidence, favors the “early-release” over the
“prison-environment” hypothesis. For overcrowding does not significantly alter the
effects of pardon proposals on suicides. If anything, it seems to attenuate them
through the presence of protective peers.50
5.4 Placebo Regressions
Nevertheless, another dimension of the “prison-environment” hypothesis could be
that pardon proposals in the Italian parliament are decreasing the levels of violence
inside Italian prisons, so that suicides in prisons might not be the product of forward-
looking considerations, but of the resulting reduced levels of violence.
Unlike in the United States though, deaths from unnatural causes in Italian
prisons seem to be very rare. During the period 2000-2003 there were no recorded
homicides, while in the following 5 years the series was 3, 2, 1, 1, 0. That is, between
2000 and 2008 there were a total of 8 homicides or 0.07 per month. During the same
period the number of official suicides was 483 so that the ratio of homicides to
suicides was less than 2%. The same ratio calculated for the US, using data for the
period 2000-2006 from state prisons and jails, is 14%.
As a result, the best we can do with respect to the “violence” explanation is to
test whether deaths related to causes other than suicides (deaths from natural or
unknown causes) depend on pardon proposals. Table 8 presents Poisson regressions
50Prison peers have shown to be important in influencing inmates’ post-release behavior in less
protective ways (see, for example, Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen, 2009, Chen and Shapiro, 2007,
Drago and Galbiati, 2012).
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with respect to suicides and deaths that are not categorized as suicides, using dif-
ferent sums of leads and lags. The coefficients on the leads of suicides, even when
aggregating two or three leads together, are always precisely estimated to be zero.
Those on the lags are always precisely estimated to be between -4 and -6 percentage
points. For the other deaths, the coefficients vary considerably more and are of
much smaller magnitude. Most importantly, none of the coefficients on the lags is
significantly different from zero, while some of coefficients on the leads are actually
negative albeit significant at the 10% level.
5.5 Pardon News and Suicides
It remains to check whether inmates do follow the parliamentary activity on pardon
proposals from within the prison confines. The news items on pardon proposals
and the respective parliamentary activity in the month t (Nt for “news”) can be
partitioned between those that are negatively (Bt for “bad news”) and positively
(Gt for “good news”) inclined towards the likelihood of an actual amnesty: formally,
Nt = Bt + Gt. As we do not have access to the main body of the news items
themselves, we devise an instrumental variable strategy to isolate the positively-
inclined items. To this end, we use the ANSA news items, our most comprehensive
measure of information over the 2002-2015 period.
Our working hypothesis is that information about pardon proposals can reach
the prison population only if this is featured in the ANSA news. This should not be
far from the truth given that ANSA journalists consistently cover not just the main
assemblies of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate but also all the activity in
the smaller committees. Under this assumption, we can estimate the marginal effect
of news coverage that is positively inclined towards pardons or amnesties, deploying
the number of proposals as instrument. We can exploit that is the positive-message
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component of pardon proposals to isolate positive news. For if pardon proposals
(PPt) generate only positive news, it cannot but be
Nt = Bt +Gt (1)
= α+ (0 + β)PPt + ǫt = α+ βPPt + ǫt
As a result, the change ∆Gˆt = βˆ∆PPt in the predicted value measures the change
in positive news, while the change in the predicted residual ∆ǫˆt = ∆Nt −∆Gˆt will
measure the change in the predicted negative news ∆Bˆt (as well as any potential
endogeneity in the news items). To test this model, we estimate in one-step the
following Poisson “control function”
St = exp
(
a+ b1Nt + b2Bˆt
)
+ εt (2)
where, conditional on Bˆt, changes in ANSA news measure changes in positive news
(observe that (1)-(2) together give ∂St/∂Nt = ∂St/∂Gt). We model the intercepts,
a and α, as linear functions of the monthly fixed effects and the pardon dummy. To
ease the interpretation of the coefficients, we divide the number of news items by its
standard deviation.
Column 1 of Table 9 shows that a standard deviation increase in the news on
pardons produced in the previous month reduces the number of monthly suicides
by about 20%. The coefficients are slightly smaller regarding the news on pardons
produced in the previous two (Column 2) or three (Column 3) months. The implied
combined effect across Columns 2-3 is even more negative than that in Column 1 -
implying that the effect of positive news persist for at least two months. Clearly, our
instrument is relevant and the results consistent with the evidence shown in Section
2.2. There is also evidence from the coefficient on the residual of ANSA carrying
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negative news, and that the negative news have lead to an increase in the suicide
rate.
6 Concluding Remarks
By falling on average when the legislature proposes new pardons, suicide rates in
Italian prisons do respond to changes in expectations about future conditions. Par-
don proposals constitute “good news” for the inmates, who might expect reductions
in their length of sentence, but also improvements in their living conditions via an
alleviation of overcrowding in prisons. Overall, our analysis provides evidence of
forward-looking behavior in the decision to not commit suicide. In this sense our
findings are consistent with two different strands of the literature: the one on the ra-
tionality of suicides, and that on the rationality of criminals (see for example Becker,
1992).
To arrive at this conclusion we exploited variations in inmates’ expectations,
as measured by legislative proposals for collective pardons. Methodologically, our
main underlying assumptions have been that (i) actual amnesty laws are preceded by
several pardon proposals, (ii) inmates follow the respective parliamentary activity,
and (iii) all this modifies their expectations about the likelihood of an actual amnesty
law. With respect to the first two assumptions, we provided evidence in support
of (i) and showed that (ii) can be defended on the basis that the national press,
a prison magazine, and a weekly radio program devoted to life in prison all cover
parliamentary activity on pardon proposals extensively.
Regarding assumption (iii), the precision of our measure of changes in expec-
tations is hardly verifiable and prone to error. For example, inmates might not
get immediately informed about a given proposal or have additional information
about its likelihood of turning into amnesty law. Given this, and since we do not
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have data on the underlying heterogeneity in expectations, we undertook several ro-
bustness checks and tried different ways in our treatment of pardon proposals with
respect to their origin (in time but also in parliament). Overall, our analysis points
towards a significant and rather quick adjustment in inmates’ expectations about
their future in prison following legislative pardon proposals.
The adjustment in expectations might not have to do solely with an anticipation
of the date of release. Perhaps the hope of early release makes family re-engage or
engage more with prisoners (and, thus, affect them psychologically for the better), or
independently improve the psychology and moral in prison (turning it temporarily
into a less unpleasant place). In either case pardon proposals ought to be “good
news” for those behind bars, and the presence of any rationality in their decision to
commit or not suicide should force them to respond accordingly.
But pardon proposals that do not make it into a law may at some point turn from
“good news” into “bad news,” crushing inmates’ hopes. Using a control-function
approach to classify news into “good” and “bad,” we find evidence of asymmetric
effects on suicides, respectively negative and positive. What would really matter
then would be the net effect of pardon proposals on inmates’ expectations. For
example, under certain types of preferences (such as habit-formation, ambiguity- or
loss-aversion), more pardon proposals could lead to an increase in suicides as agents
prefer no news to a variety of good and bad ones. Ultimately, whether the net effect
of pardon proposals on inmates’ expectations is positive or negative cannot be but
an empirical question - alas, there is no readily available direct measure of “bad
news.”
Given the noise that pardon proposals entail as signals of future amnesty laws,
our analysis agrees broadly with the option-value theory of rational suicides. The
latter predicts that the value of postponing suicide should increase when the un-
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certainty about future conditions increases. In this sense our results indicate that
suicides in Italian prisons would probably be higher if there were no amnesty laws,
even if these were to be replaced by a mean-preserving reduction in the variability
of the length of sentence.
This does not imply that pardons should be used as policy instruments to reduce
suicides in prisons. While this is obviously a central policy question (if amnesties are
to be treated more seriously than simple ad hoc measures to reduce overcrowding in
prisons), the relevant cost-benefit analysis is beyond the reach of the present study.
For we do not have the required data to estimate parameters such as the number
of lives saved per year of sentence pardoned, the potential crimes that criminals
released ahead of schedule might commit, or the corresponding social benefits and
costs.
It is equally hard to draw conclusions regarding the effect of parliamentary activ-
ity on pardon proposals. If the numbers of proposals were to be increased without
altering the number of actual pardons, the perceived impact of the typical proposal
on one’s expectation about the likelihood of an amnesty law should diminish. In
the absence of the necessary data to estimate in any meaningful sense the size of
the effect proposals exert on the likelihood of an actual pardon (and in turn on the
suicide rate in prison), the present paper has little to say in terms of the implications
of fewer or more pardon proposals.
Our scope has been to establish that the average decision whether or not to com-
mit suicide in prison includes at a minimum some rational component: expectations
about future conditions do play a role, and do respond to relevant public informa-
tion. In this context, our analysis constitutes a conservative test of rationality in
suicides. Since criminals are often viewed as boundedly-rational or even irrational
individuals, our estimates ought to be biased toward zero. Our results suggest that
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providing inmates with hope (perhaps through programs of “early release for good
behavior”) can reduce the risk of suicide in prison. They also call for caution in the
design of policies to reduce prison overcrowding. The possibility that overcrowd-
ing limits the opportunities to kill oneself in prison should be taken into account
while, following mass releases, the prison authorities should increase supervision and
programs of support for the remaining inmates.
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Figure 2: Pardon Proposals and Pardon News
Note: In the left panel, the vertical lines indicate the passing of the amnesty laws while the squares indicate the number of pardon proposals.
In the right panel, the vertical lines indicate the pardon proposals (the numbers indicating how many proposals were presented) while the
other symbols indicate the distribution of news and Google searches related to pardons or amnesties. The list of data sources and the period
for which the data is available are shown in Table A2 of the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Suicide rates and Natural-death Rates by Proposal Status
Note: The residual outcomes are based on an OLS regression of suicide rates and natural-death
rates on month fixed effects and a pardon dummy. We then add the residuals to the linear
prediction of the baseline (January without a pardon). Table A2 in the Appendix contains the list
of data sources.
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Table 2: Pardon and Amnesty Proposal Status up to the 17th Legislature
Legislature (years)
Legislative steps 10 (87-92) 11 (92-94) 12 (94-96) 13 (96-01) 14 (01-06) 15 (06-08) 16 (08-13) 17 (13-) Total
1. Needs to be assigned to committee 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 5
2. Assigned to committee 1 2 3 9 1 4 2 1 23
3. Examined by committee 2 0 1 12 5 0 0 4 24
4. Discussion in parliament 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5a. Examination in parliament 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5b. Withdrawn 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 7
5c. Absorbed in other proposal 2 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 11
6a. Approved 3 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 12
6c. Voted against 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 15
Total 10 4 5 26 24 22 2 5 98
Note: The last recorded status is based on TESEO records - it was extracted in 2008 for the first
four legislatures (10-13) and in 2015 for the following four (14-17). The search engine can be
accessed through the Senate’s web site (www.senato.it).
Table 3: Correlation Table Between Proposals and News
Proposals Ansa La Stampa Corriere AdnKronos
Ansa 0.63*
292
La Stampa 0.54* 0.63*
110 110
Corriere 0.28* 0.51* 0.72*
102 102 102
AdnKronos 0.64* 0.71* 0.51* 0.40*
225 227 110 102
Google searches 0.53* 0.63* 0.22* 0.46* 0.67*
118 134 86 79 120
Note: News and proposals are aggregated at the monthly level. A significance level of 5% is
marked with a star (*). The numbers of monthly observations are shown below the
correlation coefficients. Table A2 in the Appendix contains the list of data sources.
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Prison Population 58836.873 7239.426
Number of suicides (monthly) 4.203 2.077
Number of deaths for natural cause (monthly) 1.544 1.426
Number of deaths for unknown cause (monthly) 1.5 1.386
Number of Proposals 0.31 1.276
Proposals presented by major party 0.089 0.457
Proposals presented by minor party 0.222 1.16
Proposals presented by majority party 0.12 0.59
Proposals presented by minority party 0.19 0.815
Number of Proposals pardoning 3 or more years 0.247 0.962
Number of Proposals pardoning 1 or 2 years 0.063 0.402
ANSA news items 70.816 130.842
Number of games played by Italy in the Soccer EURO Cup 0.082 0.478
Number of games played by Italy in Soccer Worldcup 0.108 0.512
N (months) 158
Number of suicides per province (monthly) 0.047 0.226
Overcrowding rate 1.418 0.355
Overcrowding above 150% 0.495 0.5
N (93 provinces times 158 months) 14,694
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Table 5: The Effect of Pardon Proposals on Suicide Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of suicides
Number of proposals (t+3) 0.0160
(0.0391)
Number of proposals (t+2) 0.00953
(0.0286)
Number of proposals (t+1) -0.0103 0.000203
(0.0324) (0.0269)
Number of proposals (t) -0.0415 -0.0387
(0.0402) (0.0415)
Number of proposals (t-1) -0.0319 -0.0398 -0.0573** -0.0583** -0.0718**
(0.0377) (0.0395) (0.0262) (0.0280) (0.0345)
Number of proposals (t-2) -0.0440* -0.0438* -0.0532** -0.0579**
(0.0263) (0.0258) (0.0263) (0.0249)
Number of proposals (t-3) -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0238
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0192)
Number of proposals between t-1 and t-3 -0.0431***
(0.0154)
Number of proposals between t-1 and t-2 -0.0581***
(0.0201)
August 2006 pardon 1.663*** 1.752*** 1.989*** 1.879*** 1.817*** 1.895*** 1.877***
(0.513) (0.532) (0.407) (0.388) (0.434) (0.362) (0.346)
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
p-value for past proposals 0.0394 0.0355 0.0299 0.0151
Log-likelihood -309.7 -309.9 -310.3 -310.5 -311.4 -310.4 -310.5
AIC 659.4 655.7 652.5 650.9 650.8 648.9 648.9
BIC 719.8 710.2 700.9 696.3 693.1 691.2 691.2
Note: Each column represents a different Poisson regression. The prison population measures the
exposure: E [St|PPt] = Le
θ
⊺
PPt , where L represents the prison population (measured via
semi-annual census during the period under study) while PPt the array of pardon proposals per
month during a six-month window around the month t. The coefficients can be interpreted as
simple semi-elasticities: θk = E [St|PPt]
−1 ∂E [St|PPt] /∂PPt+k where k = −3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3.
All regressions control for month fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Levels of significance are shown at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table 6: Robustness Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Benchmark Sui. Rate Number of suicides
Number of proposals between t-1 and t-2 -0.0568*** -0.0623** -0.0490** -0.0720*** -0.0668** -0.0550* -0.0787**
(0.0197) (0.0249) (0.0236) (0.0205) (0.0268) (0.0306) (0.0314)
Long-term changes in the number of proposals -0.0611*
(0.0357)
Pardon 1.857*** 2.094*** 1.603*** 1.674*** 1.954*** 1.902*** 1.176*** -
(0.340) (0.423) (0.352) (0.356) (0.395) (0.652) (0.454) -
Male suicides (/100) 0.0952
(0.393)
Number of games played by Italy in the Soccer EURO Cup
Number of games played by Italy in Soccer Worldcup
Number of suicides t-1 0.0167
(0.0201)
Model Poisson OLS Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No No
Exposure Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 156 150 156 156 72 156 153 53
Log-likelihood -318.7 - -311.4 -325.2 -145.6 -318.4 -313.8 -103.6
Note: The number of suicides in the Italian male population are restricted to the age range 18-64. Long-term changes are defined as
1/3
(∑
2
k=0
PPt−k −
∑
5
k=3
PPt−k
)
, where PPτ is the number of proposals in month τ . Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Levels of significance are shown at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table 7: Overcrowding and the Effect of Pardon Proposals on Suicide Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of Suicides by Province
X=2 months X=3 months
Proposals in previous X months -0.0700*** -0.0700*** -0.0620*** -0.0620*** -0.0478*** -0.0478*** -0.0498*** -0.0498***
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0125) (0.0125)
Interacted with above median overcrowding 0.0172 0.0172 -0.00363 -0.00363
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0187) (0.0187)
Interacted with percent overcrowding 0.0441* 0.0449* 0.0155 0.0158
(0.0231) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0246)
Overcrowding above 150% (median) -0.252*** -0.246***
(0.0787) (0.0789)
Percent overcrowding -0.462*** -0.463***
(0.129) (0.130)
Actual pardon 1.958*** 1.958*** 1.949*** 1.949*** 2.078*** 2.078*** 2.075*** 2.075***
(0.343) (0.343) (0.346) (0.346) (0.320) (0.319) (0.319) (0.319)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,508 14,415 14,415 14,415 14,415
Note: Each column represents a different Poisson regression (see the notes in Table 5). Standard errors clustered at the
monthly level are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table 8: Placebo Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N. of suicides N. of deaths not classified as suicides
Number of proposals between t+1 and t+3 0.000633 0.00692 -0.0273* -0.0283*
(0.0109) (0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0165)
Number of proposals between t+1 and t+2 -0.00261 0.00887 -0.0339* -0.0387*
(0.0150) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0232)
Number of proposals between t-1 and t-3 -0.0432*** -0.0402
(0.0154) (0.0291)
Number of proposals between t and t-2 -0.0452*** -0.0119
(0.0141) (0.0295)
Number of proposals between t-1 and t-2 -0.0563*** -0.0341
(0.0203) (0.0421)
Number of proposals between t and t-1 -0.0518** -0.00412
(0.0202) (0.0372)
Pardon 1.898*** 1.681*** 1.848*** 1.585*** 0.866 0.180 0.534 0.0427
(0.362) (0.259) (0.351) (0.271) (0.664) (0.507) (0.693) (0.486)
Month
Observations 152 153 154 155 152 153 154 155
Log-like. -310.4 -311.6 -313.9 -316.3 -311.0 -313.6 -314.7 -318.9
Note: Each column represents a different Poisson regression (see the notes in Table 5). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Levels of significance are shown at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table 9: Pardon News and Suicides
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Suicides
ANSA News at t-1 (in std.) -0.206**
(0.0832)
ANSA News between t-2 and t-1 (in std.) -0.184**
(0.0866)
ANSA News between t-3 and t-1 (in std.) -0.156**
(0.0734)
Pardon 2.582*** 2.129*** 1.781***
(0.669) (0.569) (0.413)
Residual (Negative news) 0.234** 0.254** 0.228**
(0.091) (0.111) (0.110)
Observations 157 156 155
First stage F-test 36.67 79.97 111.6
Endogeneity p-value 0.0103 0.0225 0.0377
Note: Each column represents a different IV control-function Poisson regression (see the notes in
Table 5). The number of pardon news is divided by its standard deviation. All regressions control
for month fixed effects. The instrument is the number of proposals in month t-1 (Column 1),
between months t-2 and t-1 (Column 2), or between months t-3 and t-1 (Column 3). Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown at 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1% (***).
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A Appendix
A.1 Political Heterogeneity of the Effects
Overall, our analysis is quite conclusive that the typical pardon proposal tends to
be associated with a reduction in the suicide rate, but not in the rates of death
due to other causes. But it may well be that not all legislative proposals are equally
powerful signals in inducing inmates to adjust their expectations about the likelihood
of an amnesty law.
It should be noted in particular that for a pardon proposal to become amnesty
law an absolute parliamentary majority of two-thirds is required. As a consequence,
the pardon proposals that are put forward by parliamentary members of the ma-
jority could be more important signals than those proposals which are presented by
members of parliament who belong to the minority. The results reported in Column
1 (for proposals presented in the previous two months) and Column 4 (for proposals
presented in the previous three months) of Table A1 suggest that this is indeed the
case, despite the lack of statistical significance (p-values at the bottom of the table
show whether the differences between the coefficients are statistically meaningful).
Another determinant of the relation between a given legislative pardon proposal
and its power in signalling the likelihood of an amnesty law has to do with the
“credibility” of the politician who puts it forward. As in any signalling model the
receiver’s belief-updating rule is bound to depend on the sender’s credibility (see
DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010, for an overview on persuasion in economics), the
inmates’ inferences on the likelihood of success of a given pardon proposal will
depend on what they know about the proposer.
To frame the issue more precisely, the question here is whether proposals pre-
sented in parliament by politicians with a long record of such proposals (measured
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by the total number of pardon proposals they have put forward in the past) induce
fewer changes in suicides than proposals by members of parliament without a repu-
tation for such initiatives. In Columns 2 and 5 we find no such evidence, although
proposals presented by congressmen/women without a long history of proposals are
statistically more significant.
Finally, Columns 3 and 6 highlight the only specification where coefficients are
statistically different from each other: proposals that plan on pardoning 3 or more
years of sentence show reductions in suicides that are much larger than proposals
that plan pardoning just one or two years.
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Table A1: Political Heterogeneity of the Effect of Pardon Proposals on
Suicide Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suicide rate
Number of proposals between t-2 and t-1 t-3 and t-1
by parliamentary minority -0.0425 -0.0125
(0.0369) (0.0378)
by parliamentary majority -0.0790 -0.0809
(0.0633) (0.0546)
by congressmen/women who presented -0.0501** -0.0417**
fewer than 2 proposals (0.0239) (0.0186)
by congressmen/women who presented -0.115 -0.0443
2 or more proposals (0.104) (0.0895)
with median (3) or above median number -0.0975*** -0.0786***
of years to be pardoned (0.0347) (0.0267)
with below median number of years 0.0838 0.0860
to be pardoned (0.0704) (0.0565)
Observations 156 156 156 155 155 155
Test difference 0.691 0.572 0.0643 0.431 0.979 0.0373
Note: Each column represents a different Poisson regression (see the notes in Table
5). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are
shown at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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A.2 Additional Figures and Tables
Table A2: Data Sources
Source Available from
Ansa ANSA’s Electronic Documentation (DEA) April 1981
Corriere http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/ January 2002
LaStampa www.lastampa.it/archivio-storico/ January 2002
AdnKronos www1.adnkronos.com/IGN/Archivio/ January 1997
Google www.google.com/trends/ April 2005
Proposals www.senato.it May 1996
Suicides www.ristretti.it/ January 2002
Prison conditions www.giustizia.it/ June 2010
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Table A3: Pardons and Proposals Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pardon is passed
Number of proposals 0.541*** 0.581***
(0.167) (0.120)
Number of proposals at t-1 0.00387 0.302**
(0.114) (0.149)
Number of proposals at t-2 0.124
(0.231)
Number of proposals at t-3 0.0264
(0.327)
Any proposal 2.189**
(0.935)
Observations 405 408 407 408
Log-likelihood -22.16 -22.24 -26.11 -24.84
Mean dependent variable 0.0123
Note: The data refer to monthly observations between January 1980 and
December 2013. The table shows Logit coefficients. Robust standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown at 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
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